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Fallible Infallibility? Gladstone’s Anti-Vatican Pamphlets in the Light of Mill’s On 
Liberty  
By Geoffrey Scarre 
Introduction: The Hawarden Woodcutter 
 WHEN W.E. GLADSTONE PUBLISHED in November 1874 his spirited pamphlet The 
Vatican Decrees in their Bearing on Civil Allegiance: A Political Expostulation, he seems 
to have taken many people by surprise. In its issue of the 21
st
 of that month, Punch 
printed a cartoon, “An unexpected cut” (Figure 1) which portrayed the “Hawarden 
woodcutter” laying an axe to the stout trunk of a tree labelled “Papal Infallibility,” under 
the bemused gaze of Mr Punch. To the latter’s remark “We didn’t expect to find you 
cutting at THAT tree, you know,” the ex-Prime Minister dourly retorts: “All right, MR 
PUNCH! I choose my own Trees, and my own Time!” In Gladstone’s view, the time was 
ripe to take a stand against the recent pretensions of the Roman Catholic Church, under 
the leadership of its aging pontiff Pius IX, to exercise an absolute and unchallengeable 
authority over the consciences and actions of Catholics.    
 
Figure 1. “An unexpected cut.”  Engraving from Punch (21 November 1874): 215. 
 
 Given Gladstone’s well-known Anglican loyalties and his long-standing interest 
in religious politics, one may wonder why his Political Expostulation raised the eyebrows 
of Mr Punch. There are two plausible explanations. First, the declaration of papal 
infallibility at the Vatican Council on 18 July 1870 had, in four years, made little impact 
on British shores (unlike in Prussia, where the Kulturkampf had raged fiercely), and there 
was no particular reason to expect this situation to change. Second, Gladstone’s record as 
a supporter of civil rights for Catholics, often in the teeth of fierce opposition both in and 
  
out of Parliament, made him an unlikely champion to engage in combat with the papacy 
(and in the process jeopardise the support of Catholics for the Liberal Party). His 
government’s disestablishment of the Anglican Church of Ireland in July 1869 and his 
attempt, four years later, to set up non-denominational universities in Ireland to cater for 
students of all religious backgrounds showed plainly the irenic bent of a politician 
determined to tackle the injustices and bad feeling born of religious differences. Thus 
Gladstone’s lambasting of the Vatican appeared to some of his contemporaries, including 
senior colleagues in the Liberal Party, to be an untimely and retrograde transformation 
from peace-making to peace-breaking. Why risk re-igniting confessional strife in Queen 
Victoria’s Britain, when the country had long since ceased to confront an existential 
threat from the forces of Catholic Europe? It was all very well for Gladstone to write that 
“The Rome of the Middle Ages claimed universal monarchy. The modern Church of 
Rome has abandoned nothing, retracted nothing” (Vatican Decrees 11). Yet it was 
scarcely to be expected that Catholics in Britain would endanger their newly-gained 
political rights and social respectability by compromising their civil allegiance at the 
behest of the occupant of St Peter’s chair. Still less likely was it that peace-loving English 
Catholics would heed any calls to join the pope’s legions to restore the papacy’s fast-
declining temporal power.   
 Why then did Gladstone think it necessary to swing the axe so vigorously against 
dangers that were presently hypothetical and never likely to materialise in any significant 
form? I shall argue that he was motivated much less by anxieties concerning the practical 
effects of the papal declarations on Catholics in Britain than by a lively indignation at 
papal effrontery in claiming to dictate how Catholics should think and act. This 
indignation reflected Gladstone’s intense love of individual liberty and his hatred for all 
forms of oppression, political, social or intellectual. These traits he shared with the 
  
greatest liberal spokesman of the age, John Stuart Mill, whose On Liberty (1859) 
emphasised that there can be a tyranny over the mind as well as over the body, and that 
authorities that claim to be infallible in their judgements are dangerous. Even though, as 
we shall see, Gladstone confessed to being influenced principally in his opposition to 
papal infallibility by the writings of Bishop Butler, the tenor of his anti-Vatican works 
has much more in common with Mill’s On Liberty than appears generally to have been 
noticed. Or so I shall seek to show. That both men sounded a clarion call for freedom of 
conscience, belief and discussion was less regarded in the case of Gladstone because 
what chiefly struck his contemporaries was the political riskiness of his outburst. To 
many senior members of the Liberal Party from both Whig and radical wings, 
“Gladstone’s effusion,” in the words of J.P. Parry, “appeared to them to be extremely 
stupid politics since it was bound to offend Catholics, to discourage them from voting 
Liberal, and to drive them into the hands of the ultramontanes” (Parry 425). Sir Charles 
Dilke considered that Gladstone was “in the sulks” (Crosby 148) after recent 
disappointments, including the defeat of the Irish University Bill engineered by the Irish 
Catholic episcopacy, and the defection to Rome of his close friend Lord Ripon.   
Describing Gladstone’s response to ultramontanism as “the obsession of his quasi-
retirement,” H.C.G. Matthew pinpoints what so much annoyed his party colleagues: 
Gladstone was, they thought, self-indulgently riding a hobby-horse at the expense of the 
Liberal Party (Matthew 183). 
 To Gladstone, these accusations must have seemed both petty and unfair. In his 
article “Ritualism and Ritual,” published weeks before The Vatican Decrees, he wrote 
that “no one can become [Rome’s] convert without renouncing his moral and mental 
freedom, and placing his civil loyalty and duty at the mercy” of the pope (674). Although 
these words caused offence to many, they were far from being, as Crosby has 
  
characterised them, “a gratuitous insult to all Roman Catholics” (Crosby 147). Gladstone 
was not criticising Catholics but expressing his indignant sympathy with the intolerable 
situation they had been placed in by the Decrees of the Council. The point he emphasised 
was a logical one: if the pope insisted that such-and-such a proposition was the truth, then 
a Roman Catholic could not consistently maintain his loyalty to the magisterium while 
rejecting the proposition. This would be mental tyranny on the part of the pope, 
incompatible with the enquiring spirit of the age and — as Gladstone quite correctly 
noted — in principle capable of producing a conflict in civil loyalties. Yet this was 
precisely the position defended not just in conservative circles in the Vatican but even on 
home shores by Gladstone’s former Anglican friend Henry Manning, now Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Westminster. Manning, who, to Gladstone’s intense irritation, 
had worked behind the scenes in Rome to promote acceptance of the article on 
infallibility, had recently presented to the Metaphysical Society a paper with the 
provocative title “That legitimate authority is an evidence of truth” (Bebbington 225).   
Far from driving Catholics into the arms of the ultramontanes, Gladstone hoped that his 
arguments would raise in Catholics a mood of opposition to that unworthy, unscriptural 
and unpatriotic doctrine. 
 To Gladstone, it was outrageous for the Pope to place Catholics in the invidious 
position of having to choose between two loyalties, even though the vast majority would 
reject any papal demands that conflicted with their allegiance to Queen and country.  
Significantly, Gladstone expressed no great concern even about the more fragile political 
loyalty of the Catholics of Ireland, where the energetic Cardinal Cullen was no mean 
assertor of Catholic rights. The gravamen of his complaint was that the papacy was acting 
ultra vires in asserting an absolute authority over individual action and belief, while 
scouting the privilege of states to have first call on their citizens’ obedience. If the former 
  
offended Gladstone as a rational Christian and a thinking man, the latter appalled him as 
a statesman with his country’s interests at heart. According to Gladstone’s friend and 
biographer John Morley, the declaration of infallibility “made such a cruel dilemma for a 
large class of the subjects of the Queen; for the choice assigned to them by assuming 
stringent logic was between being bad citizens if they submitted to the decree of papal 
infallibility, and bad catholics if they did not” (Morley 2: 126). Morley records 
Gladstone’s anger at the manoeuvrings in the Vatican and his frustration with a papacy 
that showed no interest in advancing Protestant-Catholic reconciliation.   
 Gladstone, however, was not quite a lone voice crying in the wilderness, although 
the fame of his Political Expostulation has tended to put other anti-Vatican writings in the 
shade. Robert Fitzsimons’ detailed survey of the numerous post-Council speeches and 
articles by leading members of the Church of England has shown that Gladstone’s 
pamphlet had many precursors (Fitzsimons). An editorial in the Anglo-Catholic Church 
Times published in July 1870 went so far as to denounce the Vatican decrees as the 
“consummation of a crime which the Ultramontane party [had] been plotting for more 
than half a century.” Two years later, Bishop Connop Thirlwall of St David’s could write: 
“Papal infallibility implies a claim of absolute sovereignty over the whole range of 
human thought and action. . . . [T]he most extravagant pretensions of the medieval Popes, 
are now revived, re-affirmed, invested for ever with a divine authority” (qtd. in 
Fitzsimons 44).  
 One well-known non-clerical liberal, Gladstone’s close friend and confidant the 
Catholic Lord Acton, had worked hard behind the scenes in Rome before the Council’s 
opening to try to forestall the widely expected declaration of infallibility.
1
 Both Acton 
and Gladstone were old friends of the theologian Dr Johann Joseph Ignaz von Döllinger, 
the most influential Continental critic of the idea of papal infallibility, and Acton, who 
  
had studied with Döllinger, felt a personal involvement in the unfolding events in Rome.  
Both men admired Döllinger’s steadfast refusal to bow to pressure to withdraw his 
objections and conform to papal authority, and Gladstone’s indignation at Döllinger’s 
subsequent harsh treatment by his ecclesiastical superiors was undoubtedly a factor 
motivating his own protest against the Vatican’s assault on free thought. At four years’ 
distance from the Council, Gladstone had less need to proceed cautiously than had the 
discreet Acton in 1870. Like certain other prominent Catholic liberals (including John 
Henry Newman and Lord Granville), Acton was reluctant to state his criticisms of the 
Vatican too openly lest they be conflated with the stridently anti-Catholic sentiments that 
were increasingly frequent in the press.
2
 Other liberals, both within and without the 
Catholic communion, may have thought the papal claims to infallibility and universal 
priesthood simply too preposterous to merit reasoned refutation. But no liberal thinker 
could accept the papacy’s increasingly bullish attempts to silence dissent within the 
Church by reference to an authority purportedly derived from St Peter.  
  Although J.S. Mill, whose claim by the 1870s to be England’s foremost liberal 
spokesman could have been contested only by Gladstone himself, did not publicly 
condemn the Vatican decrees, his writings, and especially On Liberty, mount a 
formidable theoretical challenge to the idea that authority is a substitute for evidence.   
Mill’s rebuttal in On Liberty of all pretensions to infallibility is not explicitly directed 
against the claims of popes and prelates, but for contemporary readers the growing 
enthusiasm in Rome for declaring papal infallibility an article of faith would have seemed 
to be one obvious target.
3
 As early as 1836, Mill had made scornful mention of “the 
pretended infallibility of popes and priesthoods” (“Guizot’s lectures” 393).4 In Mill’s 
view, any claim to know things with absolute certainty was an impediment to the 
discovery of truth, because people who thought they could not be wrong not only 
  
overestimated their own epistemic powers but put themselves beyond the reach of 
corrective argument. Mill may have judged that his paean to freedom of thought and 
expression in On Liberty in 1859 made it needless to rehearse the same arguments in 
1870. Whatever the precise reasons for his silence, On Liberty, as we shall see, presents 
in their most systematic form a number of the arguments later deployed by Gladstone 
against the authoritarianism of Rome.  
 
Gladstone’s target: Romanism, not Roman Catholics 
 Public interest in The Vatican Decrees was gratifyingly large, and Morley reports 
that 145,000 copies of Gladstone’s tract had been printed by the end of 1874. Whether 
the best-selling status of the work reflected widespread concern about the papal 
pretensions it attacked, or more the public keenness to see its illustrious author in the role 
of dragon-slayer was, and is, hard to say. Either way, within a few months over twenty 
replies had appeared that Gladstone thought significant enough to require a response, and 
a more substantial treatise, Vaticanism: An Answer to Reproofs and Replies, was written 
at speed and published in February 1875. 
 In the preface to the new work, Gladstone dismissed the charge that he was 
making a mountain out of a molehill. “If there has ever been, and there still be,” he wrote, 
“a question reaching far into the future, it is the question of Church Power, and of its 
monstrous exaggeration into papal Power, such as it has now for the first time been 
accepted by the Latin Church in its corporate capacity” (Vaticanism iii). Even if no pope 
would be so foolish as to urge Catholics in Britain to contest its laws or resist its 
government, or to expect their obedience if he did, the Vatican’s affirmation of a right to 
direct the thoughts and actions of Catholics, backed by the Pope’s claim to infallibility 
whenever he pronounced ex cathedra on matters of faith and morals, posed a 
  
constitutional challenge that could not be ignored. If this constitutional challenge was in 
the forefront of the politician Gladstone’s concerns, Gladstone the liberal thinker had 
long objected to the papal disdain for freedom of thought and conscience. Already in 
1852 he had complained that ultramontanism exalted hierarchy while denigrating “the 
doctrine of inward freedom, the rights and responsibilities of individuality, the mixed and 
tempered organization of ecclesiastical government” (qtd. in Bebbington 120). Strongly 
resembling Mill in his high estimation of individuality and liberty of thought, Gladstone, 
according to Bebbington, had been schooled by Peel to recognise “freedom as essential to 
human welfare” (Bebbington 120). This is also a quintessentially Millian sentiment.  
 Gladstone scornfully rejected John Henry Newman’s hopeful suggestion that 
exceptions were presumably intended to the precept of obedience, noting correctly that 
“this is just what the [Vatican] Council has not said” (Vaticanism 69). For Father 
Newman, as for Henry Manning, Gladstone’s criticism of Catholicism appeared ill-timed 
because it threatened to revitalise traditional hatred and distrust of Catholics by English 
Protestants. Newman’s own liberal brand of Catholicism had made him uneasy about the 
definition of infallibility, and he was particularly unhappy that it had been brought about 
by papal pressure and the underhand methods of the Pope’s Jesuit advisers and other 
ultramontanist supporters (including Manning) rather than as a clear development of 
doctrine based on scriptural study and theological reflection.
5
 Yet Newman thought it 
ironic that it was Gladstone who was leading the charge against the Vatican, when few 
politicians had done more than he to advance the social, political and educational 
emancipation of Catholics (most recently in the Irish Church Act of 1869 and the 
University Tests Act of 1871). In his public Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, Newman 
wrote that it grieved him deeply “that Mr Gladstone has felt it his duty to speak with such 
extraordinary severity of our religion and of ourselves.” English Catholics, Newman 
  
admitted, had not always behaved impeccably; some in recent years had been too 
overbearing in asserting their rights and the superiority of their faith. Yet Newman felt it 
his duty to speak up “when such heavy charges had been made against the Catholics of 
England by so powerful and so earnest an adversary” (Newman 3).6 
 In responding thus, however, Newman, like others, committed an ignoratio 
elenchi. For Gladstone laid no charges, heavy or light, against the Catholics of England.  
His firepower was directed wholly against Rome, the Pope and his advisors, and the 
Vatican Council that had proclaimed not only the infallibility of the pontiff but his status 
as universal bishop, with absolute powers to bind and loose. As Travis Crosby has noted, 
Gladstone “made a clear distinction between the body of the Roman Catholic Church and 
what he called Romanism” (149). He may have recalled the wise words of the Gospel: 
“No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else 
he will hold to the one, and despise the other” (Matthew 6.24). Recognising how 
invidious the position of Catholics would be if a pope were to command them to act in 
ways that broke the laws of the land, Gladstone saw them as living under a sword of 
Damocles so long as the Church asserted its right to meddle. In a letter to Döllinger 
written in November 1874, Gladstone explained that his pamphlet was intended as “a 
friendly challenge to my Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen, inviting them to exculpate 
the decrees, or, if they cannot do that, to renounce and repudiate the civil consequences” 
(Correspondence on Church 2: 59). 
 Some modern commentators have spoken in belittling terms, recalling Newman’s, 
of Gladstone’s apparent alarm that the Pope-led Catholics were unsound in their loyalty, 
liable to perform acts of civil disobedience or even take up arms if commanded to do so 
by Rome. According to Jeffrey von Arx, “It seems extraordinary to a later age that a man 
of Gladstone’s intelligence and experience would actually believe that the leaders of the 
  
Catholic Church, especially in England, could contemplate, to say nothing of their being 
able to bring about, an European war in the interests of [restoring the Pope’s] Temporal 
Power” (Von Arx 230). While Gladstone believed that the bitter disappointment felt by 
Pius IX at the loss of the Papal States, and his unwillingness to accept the new political 
status quo in the Italian peninsula, were shared by many traditionalist Catholics in parts 
of southern Europe, an isolated remark made in a letter to Lord Granville voicing a fear 
that Catholics could unite in “one vast conspiracy” to reassert the pope’s rights, cannot 
sanely be interpreted as expressing a worry that English Catholics would rise en masse to 
fight for the pope (Gladstone, Political Correspondence 2: 458). But this unlikely 
interpretation has been pressed by Josef Altholz in two papers that represent Gladstone as 
suffering from an anxiety that amounted to neurosis (“Gladstone and the Vatican 
Decrees” and “The Vatican Decrees Controversy”). What really troubled Gladstone was 
not the prospect that Catholics would, at the pope’s command, become literal crusaders 
for reactionary causes but that their integration into British society could never be 
complete so long as the Head of their Church demanded “a plenary obedience to 
whatever he may desire in relation not to faith but to morals, and not only to these, but to 
all that concerns the government and discipline of the Church” (Gladstone, Vatican 
Decrees 43).
7 
      
The papacy’s “mischievous realities” 
 In Vaticanism, Gladstone forcefully restated the pith of his concern: for long the 
Roman Catholic hierarchy had been accustomed to make bold claims about its right to 
command but had not been much in the habit of exercising it; but through the decrees of 
1870 “it was decided to bring mischievous abstractions into the realm of still more 
mischievous realities” (87). An embittered papacy, angry at the decline of its temporal 
  
power, was set, Gladstone believed, on the reassertion of its authority over the 
consciences of Catholics, to show that it was still a force to be reckoned with. We now 
know, with the benefit of hindsight, that the papacy after 1870 did not enforce its claims 
on Catholics in ways that tested their civil allegiance in the manner feared by Gladstone.  
The distraction of the Kulturkampf in Germany, where the Church could with some 
justice claim to be more sinned against than sinning, and the election of a more pacific 
pope, Leo XIII, in 1878, ensured that history unfolded differently. Yet a reference to the 
text of the decrees of the Vatican Council, together with those of the preceding Syllabus 
of Errors of 1864, shows that Gladstone was right to feel worried. 
 The Vatican Decrees quotes in their original Latin and glosses in English a 
number of propositions and condemnations published in the 1864 Syllabus and given the 
firm stamp of authority (albeit something of a rubber stamp) by the Council. More 
reminiscent of the sixteenth century than apt for the nineteenth, they represent a 
reactionary papacy’s desperate attempt to keep modernity at bay. The first three 
condemnations target those who maintain (1) the liberty of the press, (2) the liberty of 
conscience and of worship, and (3) the liberty of speech. Other condemnations are of 
those who claim that the pope can be disobeyed without sin (4); that marriage, except 
where solemnised according to the Catholic rite, is binding (14); and — a remarkable 
catch-all formulation — that “the Roman Pontiff ought to come to terms with progress, 
liberalism, and modern civilization” (18). Of particular concern to Gladstone was the still 
more egregious condemnation of those who assert that “in the conflict of laws civil and 
ecclesiastical, the civil law should prevail” (10) (Gladstone, Vatican Decrees 16-18). Of 
course, the Pope had no more chance of stemming the tide of modernity than King Cnut 
had of holding back the waves of the sea. The irony is that this recognition within the 
Church was a major stimulus to the Council’s definition of the dogma of papal 
  
infallibility, in its final session of 18 July 1870. If the faithful were slow to recognise that 
modern civilisation was travelling ever faster along the road to perdition, then they had to 
be made to do so by the weight of an authority that could not be wrong. Thus the Council 
crucially declared:  
 We teach and reveal as a divinely revealed dogma that when the Roman 
pontiff speaks ex cathedra, that is, when (1) in the exercise of his office 
as shepherd and teacher of all Christians (2) in virtue of his supreme 
apostolic authority, (3) he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to 
be held by the whole Church, he possesses, by the divine authority 
promised to him in blessed Peter, that infallibility which the divine 
Redeemer willed his Church to enjoy in defining doctrine concerning faith 
or morals. (Vatican Decrees 12-14) 
The precise meaning of the phrase “ex cathedra” was, perhaps deliberately, left vague, 
and it has remained so to the present day. But the consequent difficulty of determining — 
by anyone but the Pope himself — when a declaration was ex cathedra, rather than 
limiting the scope of the dogma as Newman claimed (Newman 3), made it harder — and  
to Catholic zealots less acceptable — to question any pronouncements of the sovereign 
pontiff. 
 Just how significant was the definition of papal infallibility in 1870? Was it truly 
the game-changing move that some, including Gladstone, thought, or did it merely give 
belated authority to an idea that had for centuries enjoyed a semi-official currency in the 
Roman Church? The very limited application of the infallibility tenet made by the 
Catholic Church subsequently may suggest that it was something of a paper tiger. But the 
fact that a pope in the late nineteenth century felt impelled to proclaim his own 
infallibility signified, as Gladstone rightly saw, a papacy at bay and prepared to bare its 
  
teeth at the threatening forces of change. And as the fractious debates in the Council 
preceding the formal declaration of infallibility plainly showed, it was not only outside 
the Church that people found the principle problematic: within it, too, many bishops were 
unconvinced of the adequacy of the alleged scriptural warrant (John 16.13; Acts 15.28) 
for specifically papal infallibility, or were fearful of the uses that a self-willed pontiff 
might make of the enhanced authority that its definition would give him. That the Holy 
Spirit might be expected to provide a generalised guiding light to the Church was, on 
basic Christian assumptions, a reasonable belief. But that the Holy Spirit would ensure 
that in certain declarations the pope could not be wrong was a far more contestable claim.  
Even if this were in fact true, the fundamental problem is the epistemological one of 
seeing how it could be known to be true. This problem of the warrant cannot be solved 
via an appeal to the pope’s infallibility when he declares himself infallible, for such a 
bootstrap operation relies on the same principle for its proof that it seeks to establish.   
And so long as infallibility remains in doubt, that doubt is necessarily transmitted to any 
propositions asserted “infallibly.” 
 For Gladstone, claims to infallibility were not only arrogant but foolish, because 
they missed the profound truth advanced by Bishop Butler that “probability is the guide 
to life.” In a letter of 1850, Gladstone remarked that Butler was “the fountain of all my 
conceptions, such as they are,” on the subject of infallibility (Correspondence on Church 
1: 111).  Butler’s Rolls Chapel sermon “On the Ignorance of Man” (1726) and more 
particularly his Analogy of Religion (1736) had taught Gladstone that in matters of 
abstract theology and religious speculation certainty was an unattainable goal, and that 
analogical and inductive reasoning was the soundest route to (probable) truth. In his 
Studies Subsidiary to Butler’s Works, Gladstone spelled out the implications of Butler’s 
method for theistic belief, emphasising its epistemic humility and its firm reliance on 
  
empirical evidence.  Taking a side-swipe at Anglican apostates, he reminded his readers 
that “For the being of God, the basis of all religion, no demonstrative proof has been 
supplied, but the convert from (say) the Anglican Church to the Roman Church, as 
modelled by Pope Pius IX and his coadjutors, is taught to believe that he possesses one” 
(Studies Subsidiary 11). Later in the same work he praised Butler for his “strong, just, 
and humble sense of our limitations in capacity,” contrasting this unfavourably with “the 
daring and presumption of the claims set up by some” on behalf of the popes (106). 
Butler’s feet-on-the-ground view of the evidences for Christian belief may, Gladstone 
admitted, have seemed disappointingly unadventurous — even “revolting to human 
pride” (11) — to some; but to claim, like Pius IX, to be the recipient of infallible divine 
inspiration was to demonstrate the ultimate in spiritual and intellectual hubris.
8 
 Epistemological objections to the infallibility claim were never likely to impede 
its acceptance by the generality of Catholic clergy and laity, accustomed as they were to 
take on trust the dicta of the Roman magisterium. For Gladstone, on the other hand, “the 
resistless, domineering action of a purely central power” had long been an objectionable 
feature of the Roman hierarchy, but in 1870 “its besetting sin has now become, as far as 
man can make it, . . . its undisguised, unchecked rule of action and law of life” 
(Vaticanism 5). The Pope had made it clear that he would brook no opposition from the 
Church’s members.9 Gladstone, here in his most Millian vein, accused the Pope of aiming 
“heavy, and as far as he can make them, deadly blows at the freedom of mankind,” aided 
and abetted by an ultramontanism that “has lost the habit, almost the idea, of equal laws 
in discussion” (111).   
 
Mill on fallibility and freedom 
  
 In condemning the Vatican’s attempt to stifle independent thought and discussion 
amongst Catholics, Gladstone echoed, intentionally or not, Mill’s passionate defence of 
the rights to these in the famous second chapter of On Liberty, “Of the liberty of thought 
and discussion.” Gladstone made no explicit reference to Mill in either of his anti-Roman 
tracts and, as we have seen, claimed Butler to have been the major inspiration for his 
views on the nature and grounding of religious belief. Yet his claim in 1850 that Butler 
was the “fountain” of all his views on infallibility was made nine years before the 
publication of On Liberty, and it is inconceivable that Mill’s seminal work had no 
influence, consciously or subliminally, on Gladstone’s later thinking; indeed, too many of 
Mill’s pet themes appear in the Expostulation and its sequel for this to be simply a matter 
of coincidence. Moreover, while Butler never explicitly discussed papal pretensions to 
infallibility, leaving any views he might have had to be inferred from his general 
treatment of religious evidence, Mill, like Gladstone, wrote with polemical purpose 
against those who sought to impose their own certainties on others or sought to stifle free 
discussion. Morley records the high esteem in which Gladstone held Mill — whom he 
referred to as “the Saint of Rationalism” — for his “love of truth, his humanity [and] his 
passion for justice” (Morley 2: 152). “I always find this satisfaction in Mr. Mill,” wrote 
Gladstone to a correspondent, “that he is thorough and does not put up with makeshifts” 
(Correspondence on Church 2: 97). Notable among characteristically Millian themes 
rehearsed by Gladstone are the following: the rejection of any purported rights to 
prescribe to others what they should believe; the repudiation of attempts by the powerful 
to deter dissent by coercive methods or to outlaw free discussion or a free press; the 
dismissal of authority as a trustworthy source of truth; the defence of the liberty of the 
individual conscience; and the denial of all and any pretensions to infallibility.  
 
  
Figure 2. John Stuart Mill. Undated wood engraving (circa 1865). 
 
 Liberal values similar to Mill’s are apparent in many of Gladstone’s speeches, 
writings and political initiatives. For example, in the heated controversy over ritualism in 
the Church of England, Gladstone, while admitting that he was not a ritualist himself 
(Bentley 72), passionately opposed the Conservative Government’s attempt in 1874 to 
outlaw, on pain of criminal sanctions, the use of quasi-Roman Catholic ritual in Anglican 
church services; for Gladstone, this was a gross interference with the liberty of parish 
clergy and laity to decide for themselves what form of worship they wanted and an 
affront to the principle of a broad Church. The passage of the ill-starred and unpopular 
Public Worship Regulation Act in August 1874 could be considered to be one of the 
effects of the anti-Catholic reaction to the Vatican Council. In Gladstone’s view it was 
not only an offence to liberty but a sledgehammer to crack a nut, the number of Anglican 
clergy who were “engaged in a Romanizing conspiracy” being “extremely, almost 
infinitesimally small” (Yates 239). Gladstone disliked imposed conformity in religious 
belief and worship and, though disfavouring the disestablishment of the Church of 
England, sought to make the Church as broad and inclusive as was compatible with its 
basic principles. Firmly anti-Erastian in his views on church-state relations, he sounds 
particularly Millian in his warning that where the state which controls the Church has 
become “the organ of the deliberate and ascertained will of the community,” the peace 
and life of civil society are endangered (“What some churchmen think” 1). The worry 
expressed here is strongly reminiscent of Mill’s fear of the “tyranny of the majority” 
voiced in the first chapter of On Liberty.    
 If Gladstone did not mention Mill by name in the Expostulation, he scarcely 
needed to; by the mid-1870s On Liberty was established as the pre-eminent text of liberal 
  
political thought. This was not because all of its ideas were stunningly original, many of 
them (for example the freedom of the press and the toleration of dissentient opinions) 
having been influentially defended by earlier liberal writers, among them Milton and 
Locke. It was rather that Mill’s precise and lapidary treatment of them conveyed “what 
oft was thought but ne’er so well expressed” — nor, one might add, so well or 
systematically argued. In an end-of-the-century retrospective, Frederick Harrison noted 
how On Liberty had “been read by hundreds of thousands, and, to some of the most 
vigorous and thoughtful spirits amongst us, it became a sort of gospel” (qtd. in 
Himmelfarb 295). When Gladstone — himself not the least vigorous and thoughtful spirit 
— wrote that in the “Churches subject to the Pope . . . all that nurtured freedom, and all 
that guaranteed it, have been harassed and denounced, cabined and confined, attenuated 
and starved” (Vaticanism 119-20), both the thought and the language are highly 
reminiscent of On Liberty.
10 
 When governments, churches or other holders of power attempt to suppress 
expression of a view that they dislike, they commit, charged Mill, a theft against the 
human race. For if the view in question is right, then people “are deprived of the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth”; but, if it is wrong, “they lose, what is almost 
as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its 
collision with error” (On Liberty 229). Even the most perfect conviction that one has 
truth on one’s side cannot warrant suppressing or censoring competing opinions. Those 
who suppose that “their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty” are sadly 
confused (229), and they add moral to intellectual error when they seek to prevent the 
public expression of opposing views. Even the best of men (Mill’s example is the 
Emperor Marcus Aurelius) have sometimes mistaken good for evil and striven to 
suppress in the public interest opinions they have inadequately understood. (Marcus 
  
Aurelius, who persecuted Christianity, Mill wryly adds, was actually “a better Christian 
in all but the dogmatic sense of the word” than many later ostensibly Christian rulers 
(236). The only way to avoid such errors is to allow the free expression and discussion of 
all views, so that the chaff may be winnowed from the wheat by a rational process that 
begs no questions. If Gladstone occasionally portrays Pius IX as a power-hungry despot 
who would feel at home in the world of 1984, both he and Mill were chiefly exercised by 
the potential for error of governments and other authorities that might be well-meaning 
but which were too convinced of their own rightness. The only circumstance in which 
speech could legitimately be silenced, thought Mill, was where a rabble-rousing street 
orator attempts to stir an excited mob to violence against individuals or property (On 
Liberty 260). Wherever the requirements of public order are not at stake, the golden rule 
is that, “If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the 
contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than 
he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind” (229).11 
 A person who breaks this rule pretends to be an infallible judge of opinion. “All 
silencing of discussion,” Mill asserted, “is an assumption of infallibility” which no one, 
however eminent his status, is entitled to make (229). To the anticipated plea that some 
views are too immoral or too dangerous to be allowed what Margaret Thatcher would 
later call “the oxygen of publicity,” Mill objected that none can be categorised as such a 
priori in advance of public discussion. Unless opinions are given an opportunity to be 
heard and defended, it remains an open question which are noxious and which are not 
(233). It is true that Mill’s unwillingness ever to shut down debate on any opinions, 
where allowing them continued currency poses undoubted civic dangers, might be 
challenged even on liberal principles. Where, for instance, the liberty to voice racist 
sentiments threatens to undermine the civil rights of a certain section of the population, it 
  
might be considered an abuse of freedom that may licitly be prohibited in the name of 
freedom. But as twenty-first-century politicians know to their cost, striking the right 
balance between freedom of speech and public protection is a difficult task. Mill would 
emphasise the importance of free and open discussion of the balance-striking process 
itself, rejecting any suggestion that decisions about this are best left to governments. Yet 
even he would probably have agreed that expressions meant to instil hatred based on 
racial or religious differences are an abuse of the right to free speech that, like the street-
orator’s call for violence, are not entitled to the protection appropriate to statements of 
opinion accompanied by reasons. The case against suppressing an opinion that we believe 
to be wrong or pernicious is that it robs others of the chance to judge it for themselves, 
besides depriving ourselves of the opportunity to hear the arguments on the other side 
(On Liberty 234).   
 Mill offered a careful definition of what it means to “assume infallibility”: 
But I must be permitted to observe, that it is not the feeling sure of a 
doctrine (be it what it may) which I call the assumption of infallibility. It 
is the undertaking to decide that question for others, without allowing 
them to hear what can be said on the contrary side. And I denounce and 
reprobate this pretension not the less, if put forth on the side of my most 
solemn convictions. (234)    
One might cavil with this that someone who flatters herself that she cannot be wrong 
about logically contingent matters might quite reasonably be described as “assuming 
infallibility” in one sense, even if she never tries to constrain the belief of others. But this 
sense of “assuming infallibility” is not the one in which Mill is mainly interested. His 
concern is not with what goes on inside an individual’s own head but with the bearing of 
her convictions on her behaviour to others. While a person who thinks he cannot be 
  
wrong is merely a fool, one who relies on that certainty as a basis for deciding what 
others must believe is a positive menace.
12
 Mill cites the persecutions of the early 
Christians by the Roman state, as well as the long history of intolerance by Christians of 
other Christians, as evidence of the harm that has been done by people who are able to 
back up by force their overweening sense of their own rightness. Truth may not always 
triumph in the end, and Mill calls it “a piece of idle sentimentality that truth, merely as 
truth, has any inherent power denied to error of prevailing against the dungeon and the 
stake” (On Liberty 238).    
 The same worry about the “assumption of infallibility” exercised Gladstone’s 
mind, the kinship of On Liberty and the anti-Vatican pamphlets here being particularly 
striking. Both Mill and Gladstone were well aware of Europe’s sorry record of 
persecution of people for their religious beliefs, and neither was sanguine that such 
intolerance was a thing of the past. Let the Pope believe whatever he likes about his own 
infallibility, but the real problems come when he inflicts his certainties on others. Papal 
infallibility “has been declared,” writes Gladstone, “to be an article of faith, binding on 
the conscience of every Christian”; the Pope’s “claim to the obedience of his spiritual 
subjects has been declared in like manner without any practical limit or reserve; and his 
supremacy, without any reserve of civil rights, has been similarly affirmed to include 
everything which relates to the discipline and government of the Church throughout the 
world” (Vatican Decrees 32). Papal infallibility is a bludgeon intended to beat the life out 
of independent thought. Gladstone imagines the Pope saying, “That assertion of yours is 
simply your private judgement; and your private judgement is just what my infallibility is 
meant and appointed to put down. My word is the tradition of the Church. It is the nod of 
Zeus; it is the judgement of the Eternal” (Vaticanism 101). But as Mill had earlier pointed 
out, there are no judgements of Zeus; every opinion is in reality an individual, human 
  
judgement. Even when men act in good faith and suppress others’ opinions because they 
sincerely believe them to be impious or immoral, “this is the case of all others in which it 
[the assumption of infallibility] is most fatal” (On Liberty 234).   
 That Mill did not comment explicitly on the declarations of the Council should 
not disguise the important relevance that his strictures on the “assumption of infallibility” 
have on them. By declaring the pope to be infallible when he speaks ex cathedra, the 
Council signalled with unprecedented bluntness its rejection of conventional epistemic 
standards when it came to the most solemn asseverations of the sovereign pontiff. The 
Holy Spirit, it was claimed, would not allow the pope to be mistaken when he pronounces 
in matters of such seriousness as the bodily Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary (a 
notion discussed at the Council and formally declared ex cathedra eighty years later in 
1950). Even delegates who were initially sceptical about papal infallibility appear finally 
to have accepted it, largely on the strength of the parallel argument that the Holy Spirit, 
who looks after Councils as well as popes, could not have allowed the Council to commit 
such a gross error as falsely declaring the pope to be infallible. But since any claim to be 
divinely inspired is itself in need of validation, the attempt to defend divine inspiration of 
the pope when sitting in cathedra by appealing to the divine inspiration of bishops sitting 
in Council simply shifts the problem. 
 From a Millian perspective, claiming to know things via the direct inspiration of 
the Holy Spirit would be of little practical significance if popes or bishops in Council 
were content to retain their sense of certainty within their own breasts. But this they were 
not. While Gladstone the politician was especially worried that a pope who was 
frightened by modernity and yearning for opportunities to reassert his authority over 
Catholics’ bodies and souls would require from them responses that were incompatible 
with their loyalty to their countries, his deeper liberal objection to the Vatican’s 
  
pretensions was the same as Mill’s, namely that such pretensions disrespected the 
intellectual autonomy of the individual. The rights to think for oneself and to express 
one’s own opinions without let or hindrance were precious possessions in mid-Victorian 
Britain, hard won as they had been over centuries of struggle. In the last analysis, no pope 
in Rome could actually compel an English Catholic to believe whatever he, the pope, 
wished, or force him to break the laws of England. Yet for the pope to assert a right to 
prescribe what Catholics should take for truth, or how they should think about issues of 
morality, politics or civic duty, was to deny what Mill called the “mental freedom” of 




 The final word may be left with the Hawarden woodcutter. Gladstone was driven 
to intense indignation with the pretensions of the Vatican in the period between the 
issuing of the Syllabus Errorum in 1864 and the Council of 1870, and he acutely foresaw, 
and properly resented, the dilemma in which Catholics would be placed if the Pope ever 
asserted in practice the authority he claimed in theory. The outbreak of the Franco-
Prussian War in the latter year and the continuing evaporation of the papacy’s political 
influence in the following decades ensured that the challenges to the British state that 
Gladstone feared did not materialise. Even if they had done, Gladstone did not expect that 
Catholic men and women would place obedience to a foreign pontiff above their 
allegiance to the Queen. This was simply not the British way. Accordingly, for all his 
dissatisfaction with the Vatican shenanigans, Gladstone ended his Political Expostulation 
on a note of high confidence:  
The inhabitants of these Islands, as a whole, are stable, though sometimes 
  
credulous and excitable; resolute, though sometimes boastful; and a 
strong-headed and soundhearted race will not be hindered, either by latent 
or by avowed discontents, due to the foreign influence of a caste, from the  






 Lord Acton’s essay on “The Vatican Council,” published in 1907 in The History of 
Freedom and Other Essays, remains one of the best studies of the process leading to the 
definition of papal infallibility, being a lively and detailed account by an author who 
knew many of the protagonists personally. 
2
 Worries about the risks attendant on strongly protesting the actions of the Council 
during its sitting were acknowledged, and probably shared to some degree, by Gladstone 
himself. Writing to Archbishop Manning in April 1870, he remarked that in England 
there is a “a great indisposition to forward even that kind of interference which alone 
could have been dreamt of — namely a warning, in terms of due kindness and respect, as 
to the ulterior consequences likely to follow upon the interference of the Pope and 
Council in the affairs of the civil sphere” (Correspondence on Church 2: 53). 
3
 In a letter of December 1874 Gladstone gives a thumbnail history of the reception of the 
notion of papal infallibility in England: “Between 1788 and 1829 the English Roman 
Catholics had slid all the way from rejection of Papal Infallibility to alleging merely that 
they were not bound to believe it. Between 1829 and 1874 the large majority of their laity 
have gone over, I fear, to what in 1829 was mainly a clerical belief among them” 
(Correspondence on Church 1: 61).   
  
4
 At an even earlier date, Mill had complained, in his “Spirit of the Age” essays (1831), 
of the deadening effect of the Catholic Church’s opposition to the scientific revolution of 
the post-Reformation period (Newspaper Writings 304-07, 312-16). 
5
 For a recent study of Newman’s position on the definition of infallibility, see Price. 
6
 It is interesting to note that while some prominent Catholics responded in print to 
Gladstone’s pamphlets, according to G.B. Smith, one of Gladstone’s earliest biographers, 
“Amongst Roman Catholics, Mr Gladstone’s controversial writings may have had little 
effect, notwithstanding the cogency of their arguments” (Smith 2: 311). (I am indebted 
for this reference to Schiefen [14]). That Gladstone’s anti-Vatican stance did not alienate 
Catholics in general from either his person or his party (as subsequent parliamentary 
election results were to show), may indicate, however, a degree of coolness for the 
definition of infallibility amongst many bishops and clergy.   
7 
Another letter of Gladstone that is quoted by Morley gives a more revealing impression 
of his conviction of the loyalty of Catholics: “It has been a favourite purpose of my life 
not to conjure up, but to conjure down, public alarms. I am not now going to pretend that 
either foreign foe or domestic treason can, at the bidding of the court of Rome, disturb 
these peaceful shores” (Morley 2: 124).  
8
 A story retold by Gladstone in his own edition of Butler’s works relates a reprimand 
addressed by the Bishop to John Wesley: “Sir, the pretending to extraordinary revelations 
and gifts of the Holy Ghost is a horrid thing, a very horrid thing” (Penelhum 4).    
9
 Gladstone explicitly condemned the Third Chapter of the Constitution De Ecclesia 
issued by the Council for its insistence that the pope was owed universal and 
unquestioning obedience by Catholics; this, he thought, was just as egregious as the 
Fourth Chapter, which defined the dogma of infallibility (Vatican Decrees 38).   
  
10
 If Mill was no favourer of the Vatican, the feeling was mutual. In 1856 both his 
Principles of Political Economy and A System of Logic had been placed on the papal 
index of prohibited reading for Catholics — where they remained until 1966! Neither the 
former’s advocacy of humane capitalism nor the latter’s definition of rules for rational 
thought and enquiry were acceptable to the papacy of Pius IX.  
11
 As an aside, it cannot be assumed that Mill would, like some modern legislators, have 
wished to outlaw all varieties of what is now commonly called “hate speech.” Mill would 
probably have rejected this catch-all term as lumping together what ought to be 
distinguished. Speech that urged violence against, or denial of legal rights and protections 
to, members of some minority religious group is in a different case to expressions of 
dislike (even very strong dislike) of their religion or its constituent beliefs and moral 
code. Mill would probably have wished to ban the former, as incitement to unjust action, 
but not the latter, which, however fair or unfair as comment, should be seen as just that 
and tolerated as such. 
12
 For extended discussions of Mill’s use of the phrase “the assumption of infallibility” 
see Haworth and Turner. 
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